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European Central Bank Working Paper Series  29Abstract
This paper contributes to the existing literature on central bank repo
auctions. It is based on a structural econometric approach, whereby the
primitives of bidding behavior (individual bid schedules and bid-shading
components) are directly estimated. With the estimated parameters we
calibrate a theoretical model in order to illustrate some comparative static
results. Overall the results suggest that strategic and optimal behavior is
prevalent in ECB tenders. We ￿nd evidence of a statistically signi￿cant bid-
shading component, even though the number of bidders is very large. Bid-
shading increases with liquidity uncertainty and decreases with the number
of participants.
J.E.L. classi￿cation: G21, G12, D44, E43, E50
Keywords: repo auctions, monetary policy implementation, primary money
market market, multi unit auctions, discriminatory auctions, collateral,
central bank, nonparametric estimation
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The European Central Bank (ECB) provides refinancing to the banking system on a 
weekly basis via standard tender procedures. This paper contributes to the existing 
literature on central bank auctions by applying a structural econometric approach to 
modelling bidding behaviour at these tenders. The primitives of bidding behaviour are 
estimated (individual bid schedules and residual supply) and a re-sampling 
methodology is used to retrieve the individual bid-shading components (i.e. bid 
submitted below the marginal valuation). This is done in three steps: first, the market 
clearing price for each auction is estimated; second, given the market clearing price 
for each auction, the probability, for each bank, that an individual bid is successful is 
calculated; third, using these probabilities the first order optimality conditions are 
used, for each bank, to retrieve the individual bid-shading components. 
The data set includes the bids submitted to the 31 weekly main refinancing operations 
conducted by the ECB between 16 March 2004 and 11 October 2004. Estimation has 
been performed by considering jointly the data for all the auctions for each bank, 
aggregating the bids over all the auctions, and averaging the bids to obtain the final 
data. The aggregation is justified by the stable environment that characterized the euro 
area money market over the period investigated both in terms of tender volumes and 
prices. 
Overall the econometric results suggest that strategic and optimal behaviour is 
prevalent in ECB tenders. In fact, and despite some heterogeneity across bidders, 
there is evidence of a statistically significant bid-shading component even though the 
number of bidders is very large. Furthermore, we found that bid-shading increases 
with liquidity uncertainty and decreases with the number of participants and with 
price uncertainty. These results are fully in line with the theoretical predictions of a 
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The banking system in the euro area1 is in a structural de￿cit position vis-￿-vis
the Eurosystem.2 In fact, according to the consolidated ￿nancial statement of
the Eurosystem3 on 1 July 2005, on the asset side, the re￿nancing of the ECB
provided to the banking system via open market operations and recourse to the
marginal lending facility amounted to EUR 398 billion, of which EUR 308 billion
corresponded to liquidity provided through the regular (weekly) main re￿nancing
operations. The latter are executed in the form of tender procedures.4
Central bank operations and government auctions of treasury securities look
like similar means of allocating a good. In particular, both take place in the
environment of a secondary market which in principle allows potential buyers to
arbitrage away any potential di⁄erence in prices between the primary and the
secondary markets. However, the central bank auctions like those conducted by
the ECB di⁄er from treasury auctions in several important dimensions. Firstly,
central bank re￿nancing is provided against collateral. To the extent that low
opportunity cost collateral is used ￿rst, the marginal valuation of liquidity should
be declining as collateral of better quality must be increasingly provided. Second,
in the euro area banks have to ful￿ll reserve requirements and this, rather then
reselling in the secondary market, is the main motive for banks to bid in the
regular open market operations of the ECB. Third, unlike T-bills, there are only
imperfect substitutes to ECB re￿nancing. For example banks face credit limits
and may not be able to borrow the full extent of their liquidity needs, or they
may not be willing to extend their own credit limits. Thus, borrowing in the
primary market with the objective of reselling in the secondary market is not as
prevalent as in the treasury bond market. Fourth, there is little uncertainty about
1The euro area refers to the 13 European Union (EU) Member States that share a single
currency - the euro. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Nederlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain.
2The Eurosystem refers to the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 13 National Central
Banks (NCBs) of the participating EU Member States.
3The consolidated balance sheet of the Eurosystem shows that, on the liabilities side, the
main liquidity absorbing factor is banknotes in circulation followed by current account holdings
of credit institutions with the Eurosystem, where the latter cater essentially for the minimum
reserve system. The consolidated balance sheet of the Eurosystem is published regularly in the
Euro Area Statistics Annex of the ECB Monthly Bulletin.
4For details on the operational framework of the Eurosystem see ￿ The implementation
of monetary policy in the euro area: general documentation on Eurosystem monetary policy
instruments and procedures￿ , ECB, September 2006, downloadable from www.ecb.int.
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very short-term (overnight in the case of the marginal lending facility or one-week
in the case of the main re￿nancing operations of the ECB) for which there is little
price risk and, besides, a very liquid derivatives (swap) market exists, allowing
hedging short-term interest rate risk.6
The combined features of declining marginal valuations, low uncertainty about
the market value of the good and reserve requirements should be taken into ac-
count when modelling ECB tenders. In this paper we empirically test a model of
optimal bidding in variable rate tenders using data from ECB auctions. Existing
empirical work on the ECB main re￿nancing operations has relied exclusively on
panel data analysis without any underlying structural model (see Nyborg et al.
(2002) and Scalia et al. (2005)). Both papers conclude that bid-shading by partic-
ipants to ECB tenders decreases with interest rate uncertainty, which is against
the prediction of standard single-unit, common value auction theory (winner￿ s
curse). However, in none of these papers are the individual bid-shading compo-
nents estimated. For example, Nyborg et al. (2002) compute two price measures,
discount and underpricing, de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the swap rate and,
respectively, the quantity-weighted average bid rate and the quantity-weighted
average winning rate for each bidder. As argued in this paper these measures may
be good proxies for bid-shading only if marginal valuations are constant.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on central bank auctions in
so far as it is based on a structural econometric approach, whereby the primitives
of bidding behavior (individual bid schedules and bid-shading components) are
directly estimated. With the estimated parameters we calibrate a theoretical
model of the discriminatory auction, in order to illustrate some comparative static
results. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out
the theoretical model of optimal bidding and Section 3 explains the econometric
methodology. The data used in the study is described in Section 4 and the results
are presented in Section 5. The main conclusions are presented at the end.
5Except on the ￿nal day of the reserve maintenance period. In the euro area the reserve
maintenance period has a variable length, of approximately one month.
6The announcement of the weekly auction takes place, as a rule, on Monday at 15:00, to-
gether with the publication of the Eurosystem￿ s forecast of the average daily liquidity needs
of the banking system until the next open market operation, stemming from the so-called au-
tonomous factors. At the same time, the ECB also publishes the benchmark allotment which
corresponds, in general, to the amount of reserves that, based on past ful￿lment and the pro-
jected autonomous factors, would bring the average reserve holdings one week ahead in line with
the reserve requirement plus a technical, small amount for excess reserves.
7
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As mentioned in Section 1, the Eurosystem conducts weekly tenders whereby re￿-
nancing is provided to the banking system. The liquidity is allotted via standard
tender procedures, pay-your-bid and pro-rata allotment at the cut-o⁄ price (mar-
ginal tender rate).7 Formally these auctions are multi-unit auctions (or share
auctions) with discriminatory pricing and a reserve price. The econometric ap-
proach employed in this paper is based on the idea that individual bidders face
uncertainty about residual supply, as modeled by Klemperer and Mayer (1989),
Kyle (1989), Back and Zender (1993) and Viswanathan and Wang (2002), among
others. Ewerhart et al. (2006) have shown that when bidders have ex-post dis-
cretion about the choice of collateral that is used in funding transactions, as is
the case in the Euro area, then such a model is consistent with the existence of
a perfect secondary market for short-term credit. For complete references and
details on the derivations, as well as for the discussion of uniform vs. discrimina-
tory pricing, the reader is referred to Ewerhart et. al. (2006). In this paper the
discussion will focus exclusively on the discriminatory pricing case.
Model A central bank puts up for sale a random quantity, the total allotment
e Q ￿ 0, of liquidity (i.e. a perfectly divisible good). There are two alternative
interpretations for uncertainty about aggregate allotment. First, the central bank
may possess a superior knowledge about the aggregate liquidity shortage facing
the banking system. Second, there may be a fraction of non-strategic bidders.
In practice, both e⁄ects contribute to the uncertainty about the residual supply
perceived by the individual bidder (bank). For reasons of tractability we assume




: There are i = 1;2;:::;n bidders which
do not observe the total allotment prior to the submission of bids. The central
bank does not exploit its information about the incoming bid schedules to a⁄ect
7The Eurosystem has the option of conducting either ￿xed rate (volume) or variable rate
(interest) tenders. The main re￿nancing operations have been conducted as variable rate tenders,
with a minimum bid rate, since June 2001. In the variable rate tenders banks may submit bids
for up to ten di⁄erent pairs of interest rate/quantity levels. The interest rates bid must be
expressed as multiples of 0.01 percentage point. The minimum bid amout is EUR 1,000,000
and bids exceeding this amount must be expressed as multiples of EUR 100,000. Counterparties
are expected to cover the amounts alloted to them (not their bids) by a su¢ cient amout of
eligible underlying assets. For further details on the tender procedures see ￿ The implementation
of monetary policy in the euro area: general documentation on Eurosystem monetary policy
instruments and procedures￿ , ECB, September 2006, downloadable from www.ecb.int.
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from a maximum valuation v > 0 that is common to all bidders. Thus, bidder i￿ s
marginal valuations for quantities qi ￿ 0 are formally given by vi(qi) = v ￿qi=Bi,
for an exogenous parameter Bi > 0: We consider a symmetric set-up where B1 =
B2 = ::: = Bn. The tender mechanism asks each bidder to submit a bid schedule
that speci￿es, for any price p ￿ 0, the amount xi(pi) ￿ 0 that bidder i is willing
to buy at p. A schedule xi(pi) is admissible if it is non-increasing, left-continuous,
and if xi(pi) = 0 for a su¢ ciently high p. It is assumed that only admissible
bid schedules are accepted by the auctioneer. Let x(p) =
Pn
i=1 xi(p) denote
total demand at price p, and P ￿(e Q) =
n
p ￿ 0jx(p) ￿ e Q
o
the set of prices at
which total demand can be satis￿ed. The stop-out price is de￿ned as the in￿mum
p￿(e Q) = inf P ￿(e Q) of such prices.
Individual allotments are determined by satisfying all bids strictly above the
stop-out price, and by applying rationing at the margin, if necessary. Formally,
de￿ne x
+
i (p￿) = limp!p￿;p>p￿ xi(p) as bidder￿ s i demand at a price just above
p￿, and let x+(p￿) =
Pn








xi(p￿(e Q)) ￿ x
+
i (p￿(e Q))
x(p￿(e Q)) ￿ x+(p￿(e Q))
n





in state e Q. Thus, when demand exceeds supply, the allotment is composed of a
complete allocation of the part of the bid schedule that lies above the stop-out
price, and a pro-rata allocation of any ￿ at segment of the bid schedule that lies
at the stop-out price. The tuple (p￿;q￿
1;q￿
2;:::;q￿
n) consisting of the stop-out price
and the individual allotments will be referred to as the outcome of the tender.
Bidders are risk-neutral, assumed to maximize expected pro￿ts. De￿ne the
inverse bid schedule as bi(qi) = inf fp ￿ 0jxi(p) ￿ qig. Under discriminatory pric-
ing, the bidder i pays her own bid bi(qi) for any marginal unit, so that the resulting








fvi(qi) ￿ bi(qi)gdqi: (2.2)
Equilibrium An equilibrium can be found in the discriminatory auction for
n ￿ 2, when bidders i = 1;2;:::;n; have identical marginal valuations vi(qi) =
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for p > vd
for pmin < p ￿ vd





for i = 1;2;:::;n; where
v













are the maximum price bid, the slope of the inverse bid schedule, and the minimum
stop-out price, respectively.8
The equilibrium marginal rate in the model is stochastic as it depends on the
allotment. The expected stop-out rate is equal to the rate that obtains when the
central bank allots half of the maximum quantity and it is given by
E(p




When n ! 1 the quantity allotted is Q(n) = n Q. Then, the maximum price






















8For formal proofs see Ewerhart et. al. (2006).
10
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 793
August 2007with std(e Q) = Q=(2
p
3). From equation (2.9) three conclusions can be drawn.
First, strategic behavior does not disappear when the number of participants to
the auction is very large; thus some bid-shading will be observed also in this
case. Second, an increase in liquidity uncertainty, measured by an increase in the
standard deviation of the total allotment (or its variance) increases bid-shading
and leads to a fall in the stop-out rate. Third, if less liquid collateral becomes
relatively more abundant in the collateral pool (increase in B) bid-shading is
reduced and the stop-out price increases.
Empirical predictions The theoretical model suggests ￿ve testable predic-
tions about individual bidding behavior and interest rate spreads:
1. The inverse bid schedule is ￿ atter than the true demand or, equivalently,
the bid schedule is steeper than the true marginal valuation curve.
2. In equilibrium there is a positive spread between the (shadow) repo rate and
the marginal (stop-out) price.
3. Bid-shading decreases with the number of bidders; however, it does not
disappear even when the participation in the auction (n) is very large.
4. Bid shading increases with allotment uncertainty.
Illustration of the model The solution of the model is illustrated in Figure
1. The true linear demand curve (dotted line) is represented above a piecewise
linear bid schedule (xi(p)) which was drawn for Q(n) = 300 (EUR billion). The
other parameters are set as follows: v = 2:06 (the one-week EONIA swap rate
level9); B = 18:7; n = 300, i.e. calibrated to match euro area data (see Section 3
for details). Auction prices correspond to interest rates in percent.
Equilibrium is determined at the interception of the individual bid schedule
with the residual supply curve, i.e. the supply diminished by the allotments
made to the other bidders at a given price. The theory predicts that bids will
9EONIA (euro overnight index rate) is a weighted average of the interest rates on unsecured
overnight lending transactions denominated in euro, as reported by a panel of contributing
banks. The one-week EONIA swap rate is the main reference for banks when they prepare their
bids, given that this segment of the swap market is very liquid and the Eurosystem￿ s re￿nancing
operations have one-week maturity. Given that the underlying EONIA refers to unsecured loans,
bids submitted to ECB repo operations should be below that rate.
11
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that the allotment ratio is 50%; the stop-out price (marginal ECB tender rate)
is at 2:02, and the corresponding shadow repo rate (equal to the true marginal
valuation) is at 2:033 with a bid-shading component of 1:3 basis points. Suppose
the minimum bid rate was set at 2:0. Thus, in this particular case, the spread
between the swap rate and the minimum bid rate would be 6 basis points; the
spread between the repo rate10 and the minimum bid rate would be 2:7 basis
points, and the spread between the marginal tender rate (cut-o⁄ rate) and the
minimum bid rate would be 2 basis points. These spreads are close to those
observed in the euro money market when ECB￿ s minimum bid rate was 2.0.
Consider next an allotment with Q(n) = 375 with the remaining parameters
unchanged. This could result from an increase in liquidity uncertainty (see Figure
2). The (expected) stop-out price is at 2:01; while the shadow repo rate is 2:027
with a bid-shading component of 1:7 basis points. Thus, in this particular case,
the spread between the swap rate and the minimum bid rate would still be 6 basis
points; the spread between the repo rate and the minimum bid rate, 2:7 basis
points, and the spread between the marginal tender rate and the minimum bid
rate would be 1 basis points. This exercise illustrates the ceteris paribus impact
of an increase in liquidity uncertainty on bid shading (increase from 1:3 to 1:7
basis points).
Finally consider again an allotment with Q(n) = 300; however with a higher
swap rate (v = 2:07) and a steeper bid shedule (i.e. ￿ atter marginal valuation).
This shift could be due to an increase in the relative scarcity of liquid collat-
eral.11 An equilibrium is depicted in Figure 3. The (expected) stop-out price is
at 2:04; while the shadow repo rate is 2:05 with a bid-shading component of 1
basis points. Thus, in this particular case, the spread between the swap rate and
the minimum bid rate would be 7 basis points; the spread between the repo rate
and the minimum bid rate, 5 basis points, and the spread between the cut-o⁄
rate (marginal tender rate) and the minimum bid rate would be 4 basis points.
In this case volatility in market interest rates would be correlated with a decline
in bid-shading, which could be wrongly interpreted as a reversal of the winner￿ s
10The theoretical repo rate does not correspond to the private market repo rate (the so-called
GC rate). The former should lie somewhat above the latter because it is collateralized with less
liquid paper.
11This situation could also be explained by an increase in Q(n) when this shift captures an
increase in demand/supply with unchanged availability of liquid collateral. This would lead to
an increase in v: For simplicity we kept Q(n) unchanged in this simulation.
12
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curse and may explain the ￿nding in Nyborg et. al. (2002).3. Econometric methodology
3.1. Estimation of a structural model
In the econometric work we follow the structural empirical approach to auctions,
which is an expanding ￿eld recently surveyed by Athey and Haile (2004). More
speci￿cally we follow the approach suggested by Horta￿su (2002 a, b).We proceed
in three steps:
1. Estimation of the equilibrium price for each auction.
2. Estimation of the bid-shading components.
3. Tests on individual bidding behavior.
Denote bidder i￿ s marginal utility from winning q units of the good, vi(q). The











where qi = xi(p); and H (pc;xi (p)) and dH (pc;xi (p)) are the cumulative dis-
tribution and density functions of the market clearing price (pc), conditional on




xj (pc) and H (pc;xi (p)) = Prfpc ￿ pjxi (p)g:
The Euler necessary condition for the maximization of the objective function
is then






@pc ; v (xi (p)) is the true marginal valuation given
to quantity q by bidder i. It is equal to the price bid p plus the bid-shading
component, measured by the inverse hazard ratio. The above optimality condition
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Estimation has been performed by considering jointly the data for all the auctions
for each bank, aggregating the bids over all the auctions, and averaging the bids
to obtain the ￿nal data. This has required the exclusion from the sample of all
banks that bid at the same price in all auctions. The aggregate approach can be
justi￿ed by the stable environment that characterized the euro area money market
over the period investigated. Moreover, during the sample period there were no
changes in ECB key policy rates. The assumption that auctions take place in a
static environment is important for the validity of the methodology we follow in
this paper.
The OLS estimator has been employed, considering both linear and log-log
speci￿cations. The clearing (equilibrium) price for each auction (t), pc;t, has been
computed by equating the aggregate bidding function, obtained by horizontal
summing of the inverse individual bidding functions, and total supply, and solving
for the equilibrium price (interest rate). Hence, by denoting the estimated inverse
aggregate bid function as p = ^ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿qd, the equilibrium price has been computed
from the market equilibrium condition, qd = qs as pc;t = ^ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿qs.
3.3. Nonparametric estimation of the bid-shading components
In this part we follow the methodology developed by Horta￿su (2002b). There are
T auctions in the sample and nt bidders participate at auction t, t = 1;:::;T: The
procedure to estimate the bid-shading components works as follows:
i) select auction t and bidder i;
ii) from the sample of nt￿1 vectors, draw a random sample of nt￿1 individual
intercept and slope vectors with replacement;
iii) use the random sample to compute the residual supply function and in-
tersect with bidder i0s bidding function to determine the market clearing price
conditional on i0s submitting a bid shedule (pc);
iv) repeat for K times the previous steps to determine the empirical cumulative
conditional distribution of the market clearing price, ^ H(pc;xi(p)), taking into
account the truncation implied by the minimum bid rate;
v) then, with reference to the estimated equilibrium price for the auction, pc;t;
compute the probability Prfpc ￿ pc;tjxi (p)g = ^ H(pc;t;xi(p)) and the value of the




^ H(pc;t;xi(p)) ￿ ^ H(p0;xi(p))
pc;t ￿ p0 , where
p0 is the ordered price statistic before the equilibrium price (::: < p0 < pc;t < :::).
14
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over the value of the density function;
vi) repeat the previous steps for each of the bidders participating to auction t.
vii) repeat the previous steps for each auction.
Kernel estimation has been employed at point v). Given that the price distri-
bution is truncated to the left, i.e. the bid rate cannot fall below the minimum
bid rate, a Gaussian truncated kernel has been employed for the estimation of the
equilibrium price density function.12 Finally, standard errors for the bid-shading
components have been obtained by bootstrapping the empirical distribution of
the bid-shading components for each auction.
3.4. Tests of individual bidding behavior
On the basis of the estimated slopes and intercepts, heterogeneity across bidders
can be assessed and measured by standard statistical tools. Moreover, tests on
bidding behavior can be carried out as follows.
3.4.1. Test 1: Is more successful bidding associated with more aggres-
sive bidding?
The ￿rst test of bidding behavior is a general one, not directly related to the
theoretical model but nonetheless interesting on its own. The following cross
sectional regressions were performed
￿ si = ￿￿0 + ￿￿1^ ￿i + "￿i; (3.3)
￿ si = ￿￿0 + ￿￿1j^ ￿ij + "￿i;
where ￿ si is the average shortfall over the auctions in which bidder i has partici-
pated, and ^ ￿i and j^ ￿ij are the estimated intercept and (absolute) slope parameters
of the individual (inverse) bidding functions. The shortfall in a given auction has
been measured as the ratio of the quantity demanded by the bidder and the quan-
tity actually allocated to the bidder. Thus, an increase in this measure means less
success at the auction. It is expected that ￿￿1 < 0 and ￿￿1 < 0, denoting that an
increase in shortfall is associated with less aggressive behavior measured by lower
^ ￿i and lower j^ ￿ij.
12See Pagan and Ullah (1999).
15
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demand?
The test can be implemented by running the cross sectional regression
j^ ￿ij = ￿q0 + ￿q￿ qi + "￿i; (3.4)
where ￿ qi is the average quantity bid by bidder i over all the auctions in which it
has participated. It is expected ￿q < 0; which can be interpreted as bid-shading
decreasing in the quantity bid. This is consistent with the idea of a true valuation
schedule steeper than the observed bid schedule.
3.4.3. Test 3: The sources of bid-shading
To assess whether a relationship between bid-shading, supply uncertainty and the
number of bidders can be found, the following cross sectional regression has been
estimated
bst = ￿01 + ￿11^ ￿t + ￿21^ ￿zt + ￿31nt + "bst;
where bst is the average of the estimated bid shading components, considering
all the bidders participating at auction t; obtained using the above described
approaches, ^ ￿t is price value uncertainty, measured by the conditional standard
deviation of the one-week Eonia swap rate for the week preceding auction t13 or
by the price intercept dispersion;14 nt is the number of participants to auction
t; and ^ ￿zt is a proxy for liquidity supply uncertainty for auction t, measured by
the conditional standard deviation of the cumulated liquidity forecast error for
auction t.15 It is expected that ￿21 > 0 and ￿31 < 0. From the theoretical model
no clear prediction can be made about the sign of the parameter ￿11.
4. The data
The data set includes all bids submitted to the 31 weekly main re￿nancing op-
erations conducted by the ECB between 16 March 2004 and 11 October 2004.
13The daily volatility of the one-week Eonia swap rate has been computed by means of a
GARCH(1,1) model. The weekly volatility has been computed by summing the daily volatility
over the ￿ve working days of the week.
14This variable is considered to control for the e⁄ect referred in Nyborg et. al. (2002).
15It refers to the conditional standard deviation of the cumulated liquidity forecast error made




Working Paper Series No 793
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one week. The average number of bidders was 359 with an average of 515 bids,
thus giving 1.44 bids per bidder. The average bid amount was EUR 300 billion,
with a maximum of EUR 344 billion and a minimum of EUR 224 billion. Thus,
in the calibration exercise presented in Section 2, we set as benchmark values
Q(n) = 300 and n = 300. The average allotted amount was EUR 239 billion, with
a maximum of EUR 263 billion and a minimum of EUR 206 billion, suggesting
a relatively stable supply environment. The bid-to-cover ratio moved around an
average value of 1.26, which suggests relatively successful bidding. In the sam-
ple period the marginal MRO rate was 2.007 on average, the average secondary
market repo rate 2.011, the weighted average MRO rate was 2.0148 on average,
and the average EONIA swap rate 2.0306. Thus, the average spread between
the secondary market repo rate and the marginal ECB tender rate was 0.4 basis
points, indicative of a small though positive bid shading component.16 In the
calibration exercise we used somewhat higher market rates for the sake of clarity
in the illustration.
5. Empirical results
Not all the data are usable for the empirical analysis. In fact, the implementation
of the (averaged) parametric disaggregated approach requires the availability of at
least two di⁄erent bids placed during the 31 auctions in the sample, not necessarily
at the same auction. After excluding from the sample the banks that placed only a
single bid over the 31 auctions or always bid at the same price, 525 banks and 15753
bids (representing a value of EUR 9297.607 billion) are left, against a total of 593
banks and 15973 bids (for a total value of EUR 9327.326 billion). Although the
number of excluded banks relative to the total number of banks in the sample is not
negligible (12%; 68 banks), the number of excluded bids is negligible both in terms
of total number (0.25%; 220 bids) and total value (0.3%; EUR 29.719 billion).
Hence, the analysis carried out by means of the disaggregated parametric approach
should not be a⁄ected by sample trimming, albeit subject to the caveat that the
estimated bidding functions are only representative of the average behavior of
each agent. Yet, in the light of the short sample employed (March 2004 - October
2004) and the relatively smooth liquidity supply and bidding environment that
16Note that the theoretical (shadow) repo rate should lie somewhat above the secondary
market repo rate because the collateral pledged in the latter is more liquid than the collateral
pledged in the ECB main re￿nancing operations.
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August 2007characterized the euro area money market over the period investigated, the results
drawn from the average analysis are expected to be reliable. Moreover, the period
under analysis was marked by absence of short-term expectations of key ECB
interest rate changes, which could have undermined the private values assumption
underlying the modelling approach.
5.1. Bidders￿heterogeneity
A ￿rst evaluation of the presence of heterogeneity across bidders can be carried
out through the analysis of the estimated bidding functions for each single bidder.
As discussed in the methodological section, bidding functions for each agent and
auction have been estimated by means of OLS regressions using both a linear and
log-log speci￿cation. Given the characteristics of the data analyzed, only average
bidding functions could be estimated for each agent. Summary statistics are
reported in Table 1, where ￿gures have been normalized relative to the average
allotment value, while in Figure 4 the estimated empirical distributions, after
log transformation, are plotted. Only results obtained for the linear model have
been reported, since the latter speci￿cation appeared to be superior to the log-log
model in terms of ￿t (the average R2 is equal to 0.98 for the linear model and
0.95 for the log-log model). As Table 1 and Figure 4 show, there is evidence
of heterogeneity across bidders, with 70% of the slopes and intercepts falling in
the range (-0.002, -0.16) and (0.008, 0.85), respectively (the estimated standard
deviations are equal to 0.93 and 1.89, with mean values equal to -0.20 and 0.41,
for slopes and intercepts respectively).
Evidence of heterogeneity is also provided by the estimated price (interest
rate) elasticities, ranging between -203 and -33 (estimated mean and standard
deviations are -94 and 34). Despite the variability found, in all cases the evidence
points to highly elastic (inverse) bidding functions. Computing the price elastic-
ities using the log-log model, rather than using the average bids values, does not
modify this conclusion, with quantiles also numerically very similar to the ones
obtained from the linear model.
As shown by the QQ-plots reported in Figure 4, the distribution of the es-
timated slopes and intercepts is very close to a lognormal one, while for the
elasticities the evidence is less compelling, due to a heavier than predicted left
tail. An important open question thus is whether the presence of heterogeneity is
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In Figure 4 the empirical distribution for the estimated (log) bid-shading compo-
nents are plotted, while in Table 1 quantiles for the actual values of the components
(multiplied by 100) and the test for signi￿cance of the estimated components are
reported. Three ￿ndings seem to be of particular interest. First, the bid-shading
components seem to follow closely a log normal distribution. Second, the esti-
mated bid-shading components tend to be small, ranging between 0.2 b.p. and
0.8 b.p., with average value of 0.5 b.p. and a standard deviation equal to 0.12 b.p.
The fact that the sample average of the spread between the secondary market repo
rate and the marginal ECB tender rate (0.4 b.p.) falls within this interval is fur-
ther evidence of bid-shading (see footnote 11). Third, the estimated bid-shading
components tend to be statistically signi￿cant. The null of zero bid-shading com-
ponent, against the alternative of positive bid-shading component, can be rejected
at the 1% signi￿cance level 90% of the times. Given the large number of bidders
participating at each auction and across auctions, ￿nding positive, statistically
signi￿cant bid-shading components provides evidence that bid-shading does not
disappear even when n is large. This is one of the key theoretical predictions,
which is not rejected.
5.3. Tests on individual bidding behavior
Table 2 reports the results of the tests on bidding behavior described in the
methodological section. The regressions have been estimated by OLS and het-
eroskedasticity consistent standard errors have been computed. Moreover, in or-
der to control for the di⁄erent magnitude of the variables employed the dependent
and independent variables have been standardized.
Test 1: Is more successful bidding associated with more aggressive
bidding? The key parameters to answer this question are ￿￿1 and ￿￿1, which are
expected to be both negative as an increase in ￿ si (less success) should be correlated
with less aggressive bidding behavior. Indeed, both estimated parameters are
negative and statistically signi￿cant (see Table 2). However, the R2 of the slope
regression is virtually zero (0.01), while that of the intercept regression is non
negligibly larger (0.12).
Test 2: Is the strategic inverse bid schedule ￿ atter than the true de-
mand? The key parameter for this test is ￿q; which is expected to be negative
19
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esis is weakly supported by the data (see Table 2). In fact, the linkage between
slopes and the bid quantities is negative, but signi￿cant only at the 10% level.
However, the R2 of the regression is virtually zero (0.01), suggesting that bidders￿
heterogeneity is little explained by this size variable.
Test 3: Sources of bid shading The key parameters for this test are ￿11;
￿21; ￿31: Theoretical results suggest that ￿21 > 0; and ￿31 < 0; No clear cut pre-
diction can be made about ￿11. Empirical evidence (see Table 2) does not reject
the hypothesis that bid-shading falls as value uncertainty and the number of bid-
ders increase (^ ￿11, ^ ￿13 < 0); and that bid-shading increases as supply uncertainty
increases (^ ￿32 > 0). The linkage of bid-shading with value uncertainty is signif-
icant only when the one-week Eonia rate volatility is employed as a measure of
value uncertainty. As a general result, using the standard deviation of the es-
timated intercepts to proxy value uncertainty leads to less signi￿cant estimates,
both in terms of estimated coe¢ cients and R2 of the regressions, than when the
volatility of the one-week Eonia rate is employed.17
The empirical evidence is in line with the theoretical predictions. The ￿nding
that the parameter ￿11 has a negative sign con￿rms the previous ￿ndings in Ny-
borg et. al. 2002 that interest rate volatility leads to a reduction in bid-shading.
This empirical ￿nding can be explained within the theoretical framework presented
in this paper, by an increase in the relative scarcity of liquid collateral. Unfor-
tunately, until individual data on collateral is available this hypothesis cannot
be tested. Nevertheless, we ￿nd that allotment uncertainty increases bid-shading
and lowers tender rates, which is a result so far not considered or tested by other
authors.
6. Conclusions
Overall the econometric results suggest that strategic and optimal behavior is
prevalent in ECB tenders. Despite the documented heterogeneity across bidders,
bidding behavior in ECB tenders seems consistent with optimal behavior in a
multi-unit discriminatory pricing auction. There is evidence of a statistically sig-
ni￿cant bid shading component, even though the number of bidders is very large.
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August 2007We found that bid-shading increases with liquidity uncertainty and decreases with
the number of participants and with price uncertainty.
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0:01 ￿2:6004 0:0007 ￿203:12 ￿240:28 0:2161 0:0000
0:05 ￿0:9268 0:0016 ￿154:64 ￿178:69 0:2806 3E ￿ 6
0:10 ￿0:4288 0:0033 ￿135:00 ￿162:78 0:3186 1E ￿ 5
0:20 ￿0:1649 0:0075 ￿118:74 ￿138:98 0:3683 4E ￿ 5
0:30 ￿0:0659 0:0136 ￿106:39 ￿122:35 0:4017 8E ￿ 5
0:40 ￿0:0361 0:0232 ￿98:64 ￿112:58 0:4312 0:0002
0:50 ￿0:0207 0:0408 ￿89:46 ￿102:88 0:4586 0:0003
0:60 ￿0:0114 0:0729 ￿80:40 ￿92:36 0:4878 0:0005
0:70 ￿0:0067 0:1303 ￿73:98 ￿84:95 0:5202 0:0010
0:80 ￿0:0037 0:3322 ￿67:06 ￿75:97 0:5571 0:0019
0:90 ￿0:0016 0:8484 ￿58:83 ￿67:13 0:6144 0:0048
0:95 ￿0:0008 1:6879 ￿51:46 ￿58:35 0:6634 0:0102
0:99 ￿0:0004 4:6742 ￿33:18 ￿39:07 0:7914 0:0329
mean ￿0:1996 0:4067 ￿94:12 ￿108:53 0:4653 0:0022
std:dev: 0:9288 1:8951 33:68 39:62 0:1185 0:0065
The table reports the quantiles for the estimated slopes (￿), intercepts (￿) and
price (bid rate) elasticities (") obtained from the disaggregated (d; single bidder)
models. The linear model is denoted by L; while the log-log model by LL. Note
that the slope parameter in the log-log model measures the price (bid rate)
elasticity. The table also reports the quantiles for the estimated bid-shading
components and for the p-values of the one-sided test for statistical sign￿cance
of the estimated bid-shading components. Figures have been multiplied by 100.
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The table reports the estimated parameters for the ausiliary test regressions.
Heteroschedastic standard errors are reported in brackets. ￿ denotes signi￿cance
at the 5% level, ￿￿ denotes sign￿cance at the 1% level. Pdk denotes the results
obtained by the disaggregated parametric approach with kernel estimation,
using the conditional standard deviation of the one-week Eonia rate as proxy for
value uncertainty; Pdk2 denotes the results obtained by the disaggregated
parametric approach with kernel estimation, using the standard deviation of the
estimated intercepts as proxy for value uncertainty.
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August 2007Figure 1. Equilibrium bidding
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August 2007Figure 2. Increase in bid-shading
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August 2007Figure 3. Decrease in bid-shading
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August 2007Figure 4: Empirical distributions and QQ-plots. Estimated log intercepts, log
absolute slopes, log absolute elasticities, and log bid shading components.
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